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Abstract
Large‐scale hydroelectric dams have—throughout their history—had adverse impacts
on local population groups, natural resources, and entire eco‐systems furthering resis-
tance and protest against them.
In this paper, we aim to investigate the impact of social mobilization against large‐
scale dams by considering political opportunity structures, actor constellations, and
frames. We comparatively analyze three case studies in varying political systems,
that is, Gibe III in Ethiopia, Belo Monte in Brazil, and Barro Blanco in Panama. Our
investigation is based on field research in these countries comprising data collection
of governmental reports, newspaper articles, materials published by civil society orga-
nizations, and semi‐structured interviews. The analysis reveals that the impact of
mobilization against dams is certainly limited in contexts with authoritarian govern-
ments. In democratic contexts, the impact depends on the degree of external involve-
ment, as well as the ability of movements to avoid fracture, especially in view of
temporal dimensions of large infrastructure projects.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Despite promises to increase energy access and foster low‐carbon
economic growth, large‐scale hydroelectric dam projects have con-
tinuously had severe impacts on local population groups, natural
resources, and entire eco‐systems. This has furthered resistance, pro-
test, and social mobilization against dams. In this article, we examine
how social mobilization can have an impact on dam‐building. We
understand impact as a change in the way dam projects are planned
or implemented.
The objective of this paper is to inductively investigate this ques-
tion by comparatively analyzing three case studies, Gibe III in Ethiopia,
Belo Monte in Brazil, and Barro Blanco in Panama. We have selected
these cases because they have important commonalities and are
typical cases representing governmental visions of green growth.
However, this case selection also displays an important variety of
contextual factors, political conditions, and degrees of social mobiliza-
tion. Ethiopia has an authoritarian government that severely represses
its civil society; in this case, social mobilization was particularly low. In
Brazil, protests against Belo Monte were initially successful in the
1980s but then failed to effectively stop the dam, not least because
it was a democratically elected and economically successful govern-
ment pushing the project. In Panama, social mobilization in a demo-
cratic environment was so strong that it led to a suspension of dam
construction. Although the dam project later became fully operational,
a positive impact of social mobilization was the renegotiation of con-
ditions for affected indigenous peoples.
Our analysis is based on field research in all of these countries
comprising data collection of governmental reports, newspaper arti-
cles, materials published by civil society organizations (CSOs), field
observation, and semi‐structured interviews (Whyte, 1984; Witzel,
2000). We have evaluated this primary data using a qualitative
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Despite promises to increase energy access and foster low‐carbon eco-
nomic growth, large‐scale hydroelectric dam projects have continuously
had severe impacts on local population groups, natural resources, and
entire eco‐systems. This has furthered resistance, protest, and social
mobilization against dams. In this article, we examine how social mobili-
zation can have an impact on dam‐building. We understand impact as a
change in the way dam projects are planned or implemented.
The objective of this paper is to inductively investigate this question
by comparatively analyzing three case studies, Gibe III in Ethiopia, Belo
Monte in Brazil, and Barro Blanco in Panama. We have selected these
cases because they have important commonalities and are typical cases
representing governmental visions of green growth. However, this case
selection also displays an important variety of contextual factors, political
conditions, and degrees of social mobilization. Ethiopia has an authoritar-
ian government that severely represses its civil society; in this case, social
mobilizati n was partic larly low. In Brazil, protests against Belo Monte
were initially successful in the 1980s but then failed to effectively stop
the dam, not least because it was a democratically elected and economi-
cally successful government pushing the project. In Panama, social mobili-
zation in a democratic environment was so strong that it led to a
suspension of dam construction. Although the dam project later became
fully operational, a positive impact of social mobilization was the renegoti-
ation of conditions for affected indigenous peoples.
Our analysis is based on field research in all of these countries
comprising data collection of governmental reports, newspaper arti-
cles, materials published by civil society organizations (CSOs), field
observation, and semi‐structured interviews (Whyte, 1984; Witzel,
2000). We have evaluated this primary data using a qualitative
content analysis (Mayring, 2015). In our analysis, we apply a compara-
tive case study approach carving out commonalities and differences
between the cases (George & Bennet, 2005). Although cross‐country
comparison between mobilizations concerning certain issues is now
established in the sociology of social movements (Mertig & Dunlop,
2001), a specific comparison of mobilizations against dam‐building
has not yet been undertaken. Against this background, the nature of
this paper is exploratory rather than explanative.
Our goal is to pave the way for more in‐depth research on the
impacts of anti‐dam mobilization in regions where the burdens of
the global struggle against climate change is loaded onto those who
have contributed the least to global warming. In the following, we will
first review the literature on social mobilization against dams and
present our analytical framework. We will then introduce the three
case studies and comparatively analyze them before we conclude.
2 | SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AGAINST DAMS
—AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Donors, development banks, and governmental actors have con-
tinuously presented large‐scale dam projects as policies for sustain-
able development, modernity, and progress (Baird, Shoemaker, &
Manorom, 2015). Governments hope to close the gap of a lacking
energy infrastructure but also see a window of opportunity in re-
ceiving donor funds for green energy transition (Pan & Zhu, 2006;
Urban, 2015).
Critical scholars emphasize that large hydroelectric dams represent
a vision of neoliberal, capitalist development at the expense of margin-
alized communities (Sugden & Punch, 2014). Thus, dams can reveal
ideological challenges to the dominant understanding of development
(Gadgil & Guha, 1994). Many countries with dam projects have
resettled and marginalized social groups, such as pastoralists and
indigenous peoples (Dwivedi, 1999; Heggelund, 2006; Morvaridi,
2004). Their governments use such strategies as ways of “nation‐
building” (Gadgil & Guha, 1994, p. 110). Communities' ability to func-
tion on their ancestral lands, to use water sites, land, and forests for
sustaining their livelihoods, are taken away through resettlement,
denying access to rivers, or flooding habitation areas (Morvaridi,
2004; Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010; Urban, 2015). Grassroots pro-
test groups, social movements, and transnational advocacy networks
(TANs) have tried to raise local concerns about the environment,
human rights, and indigenous peoples (Grieco, 2016; Nordensvard,
Urban, & Mang, 2015). Displacement in relation to dams or other
development projects is one of the main concerns leading
to mobilization and protest (Swain, 2016), often initiated at the grass-
roots level (Oliver‐Smith, 2010). Protest mobilization has been partic-
ularly successful if a transnational alliance of advocacy actors was able
to link up with domestic allies in democratic contexts (Khagram, 2004).
Our comparison of the three cases is guided by a variety of con-
cepts concerning the structures, dynamics, and ideas of social move-
ments, which we regard as complementary (McAdam, McCarthy, &
Mayer, 1996). First, we will focus on the frames used by different
actors in relation to dam construction. Although we have used refer-
ence to green growth to select our cases, we aim at developing a
deeper understanding of this frame by comparatively investigating
its use. We will also explore counter‐frames employed by those social
actors opposing dam projects in more depth. We understand frames
according to Goffman (1974) as cognitive structures regulating the
perception, reflection, and reinterpretation of reality. Their function
is to guide individual or collective action (Snow, Rochford, Worden,
& Benford, 1986, p. 464). The selection and construction of cognitive
frames belong to the most important strategies of actors in social
movements (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 18). Frame construction is suc-
cessful if it resonates among the target group or the wider public. In
the course of our empirical analysis, we will also pay attention to con-
trasting frames, frame alignment, and other aspects of meaning‐
making (Snow et al., 1986). Previous studies have shown that issue‐
framing can be an important success factor for social mobilization
against dam projects (Kirchherr 2017). A second relevant set of con-
cepts we refer to are the respective political opportunity structures
(POS) as well as the wider political context of mobilization (Eisinger,
1973; Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004). Tarrow (1998, pp. 19–20) defines
POS as “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimen-
sions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in con-
tentious politics”. We will adopt this conceptualization and pay
attention to identifying relevant variables of political struggle in the
case analysis (Meyer, 2004). Meyer and Minkoff (2004) emphasize
that political openness is one core element of POS. Tilly (1978) reveals
that there is a curvilinear relationship between openness of the polit-
ical system and political protest. Direct access to influence in a system
makes protest unnecessary, whereas too many restrictions repress
protesters and hamper important capacity development processes.
Joachim (2003) suggests a distinction between POS and mobilization
structures in order to evaluate how successful frames resonate within
a transnational campaign. Differentiating between context and action
is critical to understanding the relationship between structure and
agency (Meyer, 2004). Whereas POS can be understood as access to
(state) institutions and the broader institutional context that can pro-
vide opportunities or obstacles for frame resonance (Tarrow, 1998),
mobilization structures refer to successful network‐building (Joachim,
2003). The concept of POS resonates well with recent studies that
emphasize the role of the state and the political regime in green
energy transition (Lederer, Wallbott, & Steffen, 2018; Urban et al.,
2015). Scholars accentuate that channels for political contestation
with respect to energy decisions are more open in democratic sys-
tems, whereas restrictive political regimes tend to initiate repressive
responses (Simpson & Smits, 2018).
Mobilization structures or actor constellations include norm entre-
preneurs and their organizational platforms, reaching out to a hetero-
geneous international constituency, and the inclusion of experts, very
often affected individuals themselves who can share their experiences
as testimonies (Joachim, 2003). Many constructivist studies highlight
the role of non‐state actors and TANs in processes of norm evolution
and change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The use of information plays a
critical role in transnational alliance‐building. When communication
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channels between local opposition groups and a (repressive) state
government are blocked, the opposition can link with TANs providing
them with information about the repressive situation within the
country. TANs can then exert pressure on the respective government
and demand a change. If transnational pressure from above and local
pressure from below is exerted at the same time, the government
may start to make tactical concessions or even engage in a dialogue
about norm change (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Transnational alli-
ance‐building and cross‐border activism can successfully lead to
improved hydropower development, strengthening environmental
and social standards (Simpson, 2013). However, the leverage of TANs
also depends on the targeted states and their domestic capacities
(Bratman, 2014; Hochstetler, 2002). An additional central aspect in
our analysis will be the shifting relations between different social
movement actors and their respective environments in various
arenas of mobilization, ranging from the local to the transnational. In
this context, we will emphasize that such relations change over time
and in response to the respective impact of the mobilization—or lack
thereof (Rucht, 2004). Therefore, we will also take the temporal
dimension of large infrastructure projects into consideration.
In our paper, we aim at gaining a better understanding of frames,
POS, and actor constellations in different contexts. This will help us
identify barriers and facilitators of the impact of social mobilization
against dams. Although we recognize that the outcomes and conse-
quences of social movements can be interpreted in many different
ways (Giugni, 1998), we focus especially on influence in dam planning
and implementation.
3 | CASE STUDIES
3.1 | Ethiopia
The Ethiopian government has initiated an ambitious “Climate‐Resil-
ient Green Economy” (CRGE) strategy in 2011 (GoE, 2011aa) and
aims at becoming the African leader in low‐carbon economic growth
and a middle‐income country by 2025 (GoE, 2011aa). Hydropower
generation is a key priority in the CRGE. In the Ethiopian Herald,
Wubete calls the Gibe III dam a “milestone for building Ethiopia's
green economy” (Wubete, 2017).
Gibe III delivers electricity to more than 80 million people and
even to regions that previously did not have access to electricity at all
(HRW[Human Rights Watch], 2012). The dam is located about 300 km
southwest of Addis Ababa, at the Omo River. Its construction began in
2006, but it did not become fully operational until the end of 2016,
producing 1,870 MW of electricity. The dam more than doubles
Ethiopia's current capacity so that the country will be able to sell
energy to Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. Project development and over-
sight are in the hands of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation.
Salini Impregilo, an Italian construction company, built the dam. The
largest part of the funding is covered by the Chinese Export–Import
Bank (EXIM), whereas the Ethiopian government contributes 572 mil-
lion USD of its national budget to finance the project. The World Bank
(WB) had been involved in planning hydroelectric power projects in
Ethiopia since the 1980s. After carrying out preliminary evaluation
studies, the WB, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the African
Development Bank (AfDB) announced in 2010 that they were no lon-
ger considering funding Gibe III due to serious doubts relating to
adverse social and environmental impacts (International Rivers, 2011).
In 2009, before the Green Economy strategy was adopted but
when dam‐building was already in progress, the authoritarian Ethio-
pian government passed the Charities and Societies Proclamation,
which came into force in 2010. This law heavily restricts and controls
the activities and publications of CSOs in the country, in particular
with respect to human rights and minority issues. Moreover, Ethiopia
ranks fourth among the most censured countries according to the
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPT, 2015), imposing severe
restrictions on the press and the media, and arresting journalists,
opposition groups, and researchers who raise critical questions.
When violent resettlements of indigenous peoples living along
the Omo River were carried out by the police and the military, there
were hardly any functioning CSOs in the country that could effec-
tively protest, report on rights infringements, or deliver information
to international allies. Indigenous communities—including the Mursi,
Bodi, Kwegu, Karo, Hamer, Suri, Nyangatom, and Daasanach—had
not been informed or consulted regarding the dam project. They all
depend on the river for agricultural purposes and for feeding cattle
on flooded grazing lands (HRW , 2012, p. 1–2) as they have tradition-
ally lived as agro‐pastoralists or pastoralists or reverted to fishing as
an additional source of livelihood (Carr, 2012, p. 57).
3.1.1 | Political opportunity structures
Ethiopia has a restrictive authoritarian government, which is consid-
ered as “not free” according to the Freedom House Index with the
worst scores for political liberties, that is 7 out of 7 (7 means least
free) and civil liberties, that is, 6 out of 7 (7 means least free; FHI,
2017). The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation strictly limits the
advocacy work of CSOs trying to lobby the government to improve
the situation of pastoralists and indigenous communities affected by
the dam. In October 2016, the Ethiopian government declared a state
of emergency, limiting even more rights and freedoms, to regain gov-
ernmental control over oppositional protests of ethnic groups as a
reaction to rigorous development programs. The last state of emer-
gency was declared in February 2018 after Prime Minister Hai-
lemariam Desalegn resigned from office (BBC, 2018).1
3.1.2 | Actor constellations
Due to the constraints in the POS and hampered outreach to interna-
tional allies, there was hardly any social mobilization against Gibe III
1The underlying research for this article has been completed in 2018 and does not include
any new developments in Ethiopia after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has taken office.
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in Ethiopia. The government built a strong alliance with the private
investor EXIM and the construction company, Salini Impregilo. One
of the interviewed NGOs described the dam implementation process
with the following words:
“Did the people agree?—No. Did they give their free and full con-
sent?—No. Did they get at least an amount of compensation?—No.
[…] I always say it's like Wall Street coming into the villages […]. They
just care about their profits.”2
The local people did not have a voice in the dam‐building pro-
cess. Only a few of them protested when they were threatened with
violent relocation, but the military and the police arrested and killed
these people (HRW, 2012). The demands of locally affected pastoral-
ists and indigenous communities could hardly be taken up by CSOs in
the country due to the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation.
After it entered into force, CSOs were not allowed to work on indige-
nous or human rights advocacy anymore and if they did, their regis-
tration was cancelled by the government:
“Human rights‐related issues are, you know, we are not allowed
now to engage in such issues. […] We don't have really the mandate
and the power to talk about this and bring this to the table for the
government to engage in advocacy and the like.”3
Therefore, CSOs mainly focused on providing social services and
support at the grassroots level, but did not manage to engage in
transnational alliance‐building or delivering information to interna-
tional advocacy partners.
3.1.3 | Dominant frames
Ethiopia's government was advised by the consultancy firm
McKinsey & Co. to pursue a green development strategy with one
focus being investment in hydroelectricity. The CRGE was formulated
by the former Environmental Protection Authority under leadership
of then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who ruled the country
between 1995 and 2012. The CRGE vision entails that Ethiopia
becomes African leader in low‐carbon growth (GoE, 2011b) following
a vision of neoliberal development. The main frame used in govern-
mental policy documents and expert interviews at the Ministry of
Water and Energy is transformation to a green economy. Realizing
economic development goals, however, has always been at the fore-
front and a rigorous implementation strategy has been employed.
Green economy is simply a frame used to align donors' funding priori-
ties—that is, climate change mitigation and adaptation—with the
government's priorities—that is, economic growth: “So they are ask-
ing the West to support their green economy. […] That's helping
them to gain more money, which they might use for their own politi-
cal agendas.”4 Even international NGOs confirm that this rhetoric
frame alignment is a “politically extremely smart move in the game”5
in the name of economic growth.
Affected people, mainly indigenous communities, who protested
against relocations and severe interference into their traditional liveli-
hoods, were depicted by the government as “very communal, very
primitive.”6 In an interview, an expert of the governmental research
institute that was one of the key players in drafting the CRGE even
stated: “People never accept new things. […]. They are very back-
ward.”7 This shows that if you opposed this development strategy,
you were portrayed as being backward. The government very much
emphasized how it wanted pastoralists to become agriculturalists and
successfully integrated this plan into the resettlement strategy. CSOs
further emphasize that behind these assumptions is a vision of devel-
opment as modernization: “So if you are talking about […] the rights
of these people, then you will be challenging the ways, the ideas that
you are against the development, the modernization of these com-
munities.”8 This means a second important frame or a contrasting
pair of frames used is modernization versus backwardness.
3.2 | Brazil
Plans for a huge hydroelectric dam on the Xingu River started in the
1970s as part of the military regime's attempt at exploring the Ama-
zon region for development purposes. However, local actors
succeeded in mobilizing against the project and building up strong
transnational networks (Bratman, 2014, p. 272). As a result, external
funders including the WB withdrew their support and the project
was effectively shelved (Hall & Branford, 2012, p. 852). Around the
turn of the millennium, the plan was put back on the agenda
(Fearnside, 2017, p. 19). The governments of the progressive
Workers' Party under presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff
pushed the project forward in spite of local and transnational activ-
ism, whereas the movement against the dam was weakened due to
friction (Klein, 2015, p. 1145). As a consequence, a justicialization of
the opposition took place (Moraes Corrêa & Verás de Oliveira, 2015,
p. 31). A series of court rulings temporarily halted the project several
times but were routinely reversed by higher courts (Fearnside, 2017,
p. 18). A supranational layer was added to the judicial opposition
against the dam when the case was taken to the Inter‐American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in 2011. The commission
ordered the immediate stop of the project until the legal require-
ments had been met. However, Brazil responded by rejecting the
ruling, suspending its payments, and pursuing the project nonethe-
less. Full operation of the dam is foreseen for 2020.
3.2.1 | Political opportunity structures
Since the late 1980s, mobilizations against the dam have taken place
in a context of democratic transition and consolidation. Information





6Interview Ministry of Water and Energy
7Interview Governmental Research Institute
8Interview Ethiopian NGO_2
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approved by Congress in 2004 contained thorough modifications of
the original plan drafted by the military rulers, a fact that has been
interpreted as a sign of considerable responsiveness of the Brazilian
democracy (Burrier, 2016, p. 347). The 2009 World Social Forum in
Belém presented an important opportunity to raise worldwide aware-
ness for the threat presented by Belo Monte.
In spite of these favorable conditions, mobilization impact was
hampered by Brazilian economic autonomy: as opposed to the situa-
tion in the 1980s, the government could later realize the project
without depending on external funding. This made it harder for activ-
ists to leverage the TANs because pressuring funding agencies, such
as the WB or others, would not prevent the project (Bratman, 2014,
p. 285). Brazil's strong political and financial position as an important
regional player helped in its blunt rebuttal of the ruling by the IACHR,
which demonstrated the limitations of the inter‐American system of
supranational law (Riethof, 2017, p. 493). Although Brazil is a func-
tioning democracy with a vibrant civil society sector, activists are
often threatened with violence. Furthermore, their criminalization is
bound to intensify under the new president Jair Bolsonaro.9
3.2.2 | Actor constellations
In the process through which the dam on the Xingu River was put
back on the agenda, the Brazilian electricity agency Eletrobrás played
a central role. It is part of an influential constellation of pro‐dam
actors, which also includes the construction companies and industries
producing electro‐intensive commodities as well as mining companies
(Hall & Branford, 2012, p. 852).
Surprisingly, the Workers' Party—especially Dilma Rousseff, as
Minister of Mines and Energy and later as president of Brazil—pushed
the project. Although corruption played a role in the party's support
for the dam (Fearnside, 2017, p. 17), the project is also in line with its
general neo‐developmentalist vision of state capitalism (Hall & Bran-
ford, 2012, p. 855). Despite public funding, the government deliber-
ately refrains from dominating the construction consortium Norte
Energia. Thus, the project is “government‐driven” but not “govern-
ment‐run” (Klein, 2015, p. 1139), which illustrates a typical parallel-
ism of neo‐developmentalist and neoliberal policies (Saad‐Filho &
Morais, 2012).
At the beginning, the most important opposition movement
against the dam was the Movimento Pelo Desenvolvimento da Tran-
samazônica e Xingu (MDTX). However, the pro‐dam stance of the
Workers' Party, with which the movement had strong ideational and
material ties, caused a deep conflict of loyalty, illustrating a pattern
of former movement allies turning into competitors and adversaries
(Rucht, 2004, p. 209). Against this background, the MDTX and other
organizations settled for an uneasy neutrality towards the dam and
participated in negotiations over mitigation efforts, defending their
position as based on an ethic of responsibility (Klein, 2015, p. 1147).
When the actual implementation of the project began in 2010, a
rupture with the intransigent section of the movement emerged,
which was led by the Movimento Xingu Vivo Para Sempre. Its princi-
pled opposition was supported by the Catholic Church, especially the
local Bishop Dom Erwin Kräutler. Among the CSOs engaged in the
struggle for resettlement and compensation for the affected
populations, the Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens (Movement
of People affected by Dams) has acquired a more prominent role in
recent years.
Indigenous leaders have also been at the forefront of the strug-
gle against Belo Monte. However, in recent years the pro‐dam side
has succeeded in convincing many indigenous leaders to abandon
their opposition in exchange for material rewards, which has led to
severe friction within communities (Fearnside, 2017, p. 19).
Given the justicialization of the conflict, legal actors also play a
major role in the fight against the dam. This is especially true for the
Ministério Publico, a special prosecutor in defense of the interests of
the people. The branch in the state of Pará was the main driving force
of a series of important—if temporary—legal victories against
the dam.
3.2.3 | Dominant frames
One of the dominant frames recurred to in defense of the dam pro-
ject is the claim that it provides clean energy and thereby contributes
to the global goal of fighting climate change (Moraes Corrêa & Verás
de Oliveira, 2015, p. 34). Belo Monte, as a model for clean energy
generation, was the key message of the government's advertising
campaign during the Rio + 20 summit in 2012, when it presented
itself as a leader in the fight against climate change (Bratman, 2015,
p. 72). In opposing this framing, anti‐dam activists also emphasized
the importance of preserving the planet, highlighting that the Ama-
zon rain forest, which is threatened by the dam, is part of the “funda-
mental natural heritage for all Brazilians and all citizens of the world”
(MDTX, 2001).
Besides its emphasis on clean energy, the government's priority
is clearly economic growth, as is expressed in the name of its flagship
program, the Plan for the Acceleration of Growth. In documents justify-
ing Belo Monte, development is the most common frame. In the
government's response to the IACHR ruling, it emphasized that elec-
tricity was fundamental for “Brazil's development goals,” including
the goals to “promote human dignity, eradicate extreme poverty, and
reduce inequalities” (Riethof, 2017, p. 491). Such claims are explicitly
rejected by anti‐dam activists: “[W]e feel affronted in our dignity and
disrespected in our fundamental rights by the Brazilian state and pri-
vate groups through the construction of dams on the Xingu […]”
(Encontro Xingu Vivo para Sempre, 2008). Some of the activists
emphasize the extreme inequality in the distribution of the benefits
of the project: “The dam produces riches for a few, but at the same
time it puts people into a state of absolute misery.”10 Others reject
the underlying developmentalist vision altogether: “We are against
9Interview member of Xingo Vivo Para Sempre based in Belém. 10Interview coordinator of MAB based in Altamira.
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this model of exploitation, reprimarization and exportation. […] Each
people has its own way to relate to nature and we need to respect
this.”11
Another decisive frame is democracy: For example, in 2010, Lula
stated that the realization of the dam was a “democratic act” (Lula da
Silva, 2010). In direct reaction to this speech, anti‐dam activists recal-
led that in Altamira, the city close to the dam, this alleged act of
democracy was always accompanied by a strong presence of police
and military, drawing a parallel between Lula's visit to the Amazon
and that of military dictator Médici in the 1970s (Salm, 2010).
3.3 | Panama
There has been social mobilization against dam‐building on the
Tabasará River in Panama since the 1970s, when the government
first embarked on a drive to exploit water flows for energy (Campbell,
2014; Rubio & Tafunell, 2014). Following two failed proposals, the
Barro Blanco project was the third dam to result in organized protest.
The dam will flood land in the comarca Ngäbe‐Buglé, an autonomous
territory created in 1997 for the exclusive use of the local indigenous
population.
The concessions to construct Barro Blanco were granted to
developer Generadora del Istmo, S. A. (GENISA) in 2007 (Hofbauer &
Mayrhofer, 2016). It was first proposed as a 19 MW structure; how-
ever, it was later increased to 28.84 MW. Despite making a consider-
able difference to the maximum flood level, only one Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted, using the specifications of
the smaller dam (Jordan, 2008). Funding was secured from two Euro-
pean state‐owned development banks, the Netherlands Develop-
ment Finance Company (FMO) and the German Investment
Corporation (DEG), alongside the Central American Bank for Eco-
nomic Integration (CABEI). Following a consultation period, the dam
was registered as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project
in 2011.
When construction began in 2011, access to the site was
restricted by Ngäbe protesters (Sogandares, 2011). This set in motion
a protest movement that would last over 7 years, with tactics ranging
from direct action on the ground to petitioning German and Dutch
embassies (Watts, Brannum, & Ruff, 2014). Following sustained pres-
sure and social mobilization in the form of marches, preventing
access to the site, and blockading the Pan‐American Highway, the
Ngäbe gained international attention and support (Watts et al.,
2014). This resulted in James Anaya, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Indigenous Peoples, visiting to investigate the situation in 2014 (UN
Special Rapporteur, 2014). He ruled that the dam should only have
been constructed following the prior agreement of the indigenous
communities (Anaya, 2014). His decision influenced the Panamanian
National Environmental Authority's ruling to suspend the dam due to
an improper EIA in 2015, a direct result of the social mobilization that
encouraged his visit. However, this suspension was later overturned
by the Panama Supreme Court (Hofbauer & Mayrhofer, 2016, p. 19).
Thereafter, the movement continued and following international
scrutiny, the project was de‐registered from the CDM in 2016.
Despite this, the dam has reached completion, forcibly evicting the
affected communities.
3.3.1 | Political opportunity structures
The democratic political system of Panama enabled the movement to
challenge the dam in the judicial sphere (AIDA, 2012). This was
despite several amendments to domestic environmental law that
removed the need for participation from indigenous communities
(Runk, 2012: p.28). Further, the government engaged in a number of
dialogues over a sustained period with the movement, these took
place with three separately elected governing parties—Osvaldo Jor-
dan of the Panamanian NGO Alianza para la Conservación y el
Desarrollo (ACD) noted that this demonstrated a “political consensus
against indigenous people at the highest level.”12
The dam was funded by Western financing agencies (Hofbauer &
Mayrhofer, 2016). The promise of funding made challenging the dam
through the IACHR within the time constraints of its construction
almost impossible. The movement was free to form transnational alli-
ances and discuss the dam with media sources. This resulted in an
international campaign that attempted to force compliance with
internationally accepted human rights standards.
3.3.2 | Actor constellations
Within the opposition, there were several indigenous resistance
groups with various leaders but the Movimiento 10 de Abril (M‐10)
was the most important actor. They had experience in defeating pre-
vious dams and their leader, Manolo Miranda, lived within the flood-
plain alongside his family. He was determined to fight by any means,
and the tactics of the M‐10 often conflicted with the diplomatic
efforts of the Ngäbe General Cacica Silvia Carrera (Kennedy, 2016).
Cacica Carrera was crucial in representing the community at the
negotiating table and following the M‐10's successful blockade of the
construction site, she was invited to engage in talks with the govern-
ment in 2011 culminating in the San Felix Agreement (DEG, 2015).
This accord contained a government promise to prohibit mining
within the comarca. However, ongoing projects were to continue,
including Barro Blanco (DEG, 2015). This agreement was unaccept-
able to the M‐10, who escalated their tactics by blocking the Pan‐
American Highway in 2012. In response, the Panamanian govern-
ment authorized the use of teargas and birdshot; resulting in allega-
tions of police brutality and the death of one indigenous protester
(Watts et al., 2014). These violent and well‐publicized events pres-
sured the government into further negotiations with the Cacica,
mediated by the Catholic Church (DEG, 2015). This resulted in
11Interview member of Xingu Vivo Para Sempre based in Belém. 12Interview Osvaldo Jordan, ACD
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changes to Law 11 of the mining code that would prohibit mining
within the comarca and stipulated that all future projects were sub-
ject to the approval of Ngäbe‐Buglé regional congresses (Cortez,
2012; DEG, 2015). The combination of the Cacica's willingness to
negotiate and the M‐10's direct action and resistance resulted in sig-
nificant amendments to national law that would protect the comarca
in the future. This is a notable achievement; however, the M‐10
refused to accept the continuation of Barro Blanco. Thereafter, the
movement was divided, with some accepting the concessions made
by Carrera and others siding with the M‐10 (Cansari &
Gausset, 2013).
The M‐10 had support throughout the comarca, particularly by
adherents of the Mama Tata religion. Osvaldo Jordan explained:
“Flooding the sacred Kiad site was going against the Mama Tata, it's
very important that the dam will flood this region. There was a lot of
support from other believers.”13
They were also effective in network‐building outside the indige-
nous community, gaining support from TANs, including AIDA and
International Rivers. These organizations linked up with domestic
CSOs, such as the ACD and the Centro de Incidencia Ambiental. They
were crucial in supporting judicial efforts, whereas international
CSOs, such as Both Ends, raised a complaint against the financiers.
The movement also allied with social and environmental organiza-
tions who were campaigning for an end to mining and to protect
water flows worldwide (Rivera, 2016).
On the side supporting the dam, the financiers FMO, DEG, and
CABEI were the dominant force pushing the project onwards. They
had committed funding and refused to consider cancelling. They
worked with GENISA to argue that the dam was beneficial to the
affected communities (Hofbauer & Mayrhofer, 2016). Further, they
formed a close alliance and were difficult to challenge, particularly as
they had the support of the government.
3.3.3 | Dominant frames
One of the key frames used by the proponents of Barro Blanco is
that dams provide vital clean energy for Panama's growing demands
(Gordon, 2010). They have become a symbol of green development
in Panama, both tackling climate change and increasing electricity
production, as well as creating investment opportunities and eco-
nomic growth (Campbell, 2014). Panama was one of the first states
to ratify the Paris Agreement (2015) and this commitment to a sus-
tainable future played a key role in governmental decisions.
Despite the government's commitment to green energy, the cru-
cial factor in their support for hydropower projects is economic
growth and investment. They frame Barro Blanco as an opportunity
that is integral to the modernization of the indigenous communities
who have been broadly portrayed as “backwards” (Mayhew et al.,
2010, p. 9). Therefore, dams are framed as essential in their progres-
sion towards a modern way of life.
Opponents to the project frame the protest movement as an
attempt to preserve Panama's traditions. They have often pointed
out that the Ngäbe were in Panama before the arrival of the Spanish
(Rosario, 2011). This argument can be aligned with carbon colonial-
ism, where foreign investment results in the destruction of indige-
nous territories (Newell & Paterson, 2010). However, the indigenous
opposition were predominantly concerned with the preservation of
their traditional life; they were fighting to protect their homes, reli-
gion, and heritage.
4 | COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND
DISCUSSION
There are a few commonalities that can be observed in all three cases.
The vision behind these large‐scale projects is to foster neoliberal
development with a focus on economic growth. More precisely, we
find two major frames used in relation to dams. The first is clean
energy and development, green economy or green growth. Here, state
actors align their discourse with the global goal of reducing green-
house gas emissions, whereas at the same time, fostering economic
growth as a national priority. “Green” is synonymously used as low‐
carbon, whereas all dam endeavors had serious environmental impli-
cations and led to the disruption of delicate ecosystems. In all of our
cases, development is understood as modernization, a second domi-
nant frame often used to justify adverse effects on indigenous com-
munities and the destruction of their traditional livelihoods. Dam
opposing movements have introduced counter‐frames, including
inequality and injustice, often relating to the unfair distribution of
material benefits but also to lacking procedural justice mechanisms,
including access to information, transparency, participation in deci-
sion‐making, and remedies.
A number of key differences between Gibe III, Belo Monte, and
Barro Blanco can be observed in the POS. Due to the restrictive
political environment in Ethiopia, any activism or mobilization against
Gibe III was blocked (FHI, 2017). This was not the case in either Brazil
or Panama.
Another interesting difference with regard to POS concerns the
involvement of international donors. In both Brazil and Ethiopia, the
WB was involved in the beginning but later withdrew its support in
view of anticipated adverse effects of the dam project. While Brazil
ultimately managed to finance the project mostly on its own, Ethiopia
sought support from Chinese investors. Barro Blanco in Panama was
the only example of involvement of Western financing agencies,
including the Dutch FMO and the German DEG, alongside the Cen-
tral American Bank for Economic Integration—and this had an impact
on social mobilization, in particular the renegotiation of conditions
for affected population groups.
In Brazil and Panama, a considerable share of mobilization was
carried out in the judicial sphere and in lawsuits, which were tempo-
rarily successful in stopping dam construction. Both countries are
also embedded in a system of supranational courts. However, the
results were surprisingly unsuccessful: Brazil simply rejected the13Interview, Osvaldo Jordan, ACD
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ruling, whereas Panama's Supreme Court ruled in favor of a continua-
tion of dam construction before a decision by the IACHR was made.
Actor constellations reveal more differences between the three
cases. In the Ethiopian case, we can see how local CSOs offer ser-
vices to the affected population but there is no transnational alli-
ance‐building. In Panama, we could observe a highly institutionalized
domestic social movement that reached out to international CSOs
and built strong transnational alliances. The movement opposing Belo
Monte in Brazil was well institutionalized at times but later became
fragmented. Transnational alliance‐building in this case was also
strong but could not be upheld. We have also observed heterogene-
ity within indigenous groups, mainly in the Brazilian case, regarding
goal prioritization.
Table 1 summarizes the case comparison.
In all three cases, social mobilization could not stop the dams
from being built but had a varying impact on dam‐building. When
explaining this outcome across our cases, several factors have to be
considered.
For Ethiopia, we can observe that the authoritarian regime sim-
ply did not allow for any political mobilization against the dam project
in order to raise awareness of the negative impacts or build transna-
tional alliances.
Although this adverse POS can go a long way to explain the fail-
ures of social movement mobilization in Ethiopia, it will not suffice
for Panama and Brazil. In both Latin American cases, social mobiliza-
tion was not repressed by the state, and transnational activism was
possible. Here, findings concerning the actor constellations and the
framing practices become relevant: One decisive factor, which weak-
ened the mobilization and affected its impact on politics in both Pan-
ama and Brazil, was friction within the movements. Although in the
Brazilian case, this was also due to bonds of loyalty between the
ruling Workers' Party and several social movement organizations, the
commonality between the two cases is linked to the time dimension
of contentious politics around infrastructure projects; when the
objects of contention are hydroelectric dams, there is a critical point
at which the physical conditions of a place are altered so thoroughly
that it becomes impossible to reconstruct the status quo ante. In Bra-
zil and Panama, when the point of no return was reached, friction
within the movements increased, namely between those who upheld
principled opposition and those who argued in favor of negotiating
compensations.
In spite of these similarities, there remains a striking difference
between the two. The social movements against the dam in Panama
did reach some meaningful alterations of conditions, which was not
the case in Brazil. Here, the involvement of external Western donors
in Panama as opposed to the financial autonomy in Brazil plays an
important role; because such actors are nominally committed to
international norms on dam‐building and potentially vulnerable to
public naming and shaming, they tend to be more susceptible to
transnational mobilization than other actors.
5 | CONCLUSION
Our comparative analysis of three cases has revealed that several
factors can hamper the impact of such mobilizations; apart from the
restrictions imposed by an authoritarian regime such as the Ethiopian
one, other factors are highly relevant.
One of them is the involvement of external actors and the
respective degree of financial independence of the state of the pro-
ject. Here, our findings point to what can be called a paradox of
emancipation. The emancipation from a long‐standing dependence
on international donors, such as the WB, resulted in a loss of leverage
for TANs because transnational advocacy could not build on
TABLE 1 Comparative analysis of Gibe III, Belo Monte, and Barro Blanco
Gibe III Belo Monte Barro Blanco
Commonalities
Development Vision Neoliberal development with a focus on economic growth Brazil: neo‐developmentalism in parallel with
neoliberalism
Dominant Frames Green growth, modernization, and progress
Counter‐Frames Inequality and injustice
Affected Population Groups Indigenous peoples (Brazil: non‐indigenous peasants)
Differences
Political System Not free Free Free








No Yes, but later fragmented Yes
Alliance Building No Yes Yes
Judicial Activism No Yes Yes
Impact of social mobilization None Low (temporary suspensions) Re‐negotiation of conditions
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international (non‐binding) norms, like the WB's environmental and
social safeguard policies, and this indirectly favored the implementa-
tion of highly problematic infrastructure projects.
Another relevant finding concerns the power of frames such as
“green development,” by which the dam coalitions can support and
enforce their projects in line with national and global goals,
suggesting that the respective projects can solve the dilemma of eco-
nomic growth and environmental sustainability.
Our analysis also reveals a certain temporal and physical particu-
larity of dams and other large infrastructure projects: Once the huge
walls of a dam are built, once a river is deviated or a territory flooded,
“un‐building” these works is extremely costly and will not undo the
damage. From the perspective of the pro‐dam coalitions, the suspen-
sion or termination of such a project would result in massive sunk
costs and a loss of reputation. For the counter‐movements, in turn,
accepting the projects and negotiating better conditions and com-
pensations becomes a reasonable impact strategy in line with an
ethics of responsibility. The ensuing friction between different
strands of the movements leads to further limitations of their impact.
These preliminary findings would have to be complemented by
more empirical studies. In a context in which both authoritarianism
and the urgency of finding answers to climate change are on the rise,
the possibilities of contesting interventions into the lives of those
who are most vulnerable to and least responsible for these develop-
ments remain an important justice issue.
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